I argue that a criterion of theoretical equivalence due to Clark Glymour [Noûs 11(3), 227-251 (1977)] does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I then motivate and state an alternative criterion that does capture the sense of equivalence I have in mind. The principal claim of the paper is that relative to this second criterion, the answer to the question posed in the title is "yes", at least on one natural understanding of Newtonian gravitation.
Introduction
Are Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravitation (Newton-Cartan Theory) equivalent theories? Clark Glymour (1970 Glymour ( , 1977 Glymour ( , 1980 has articulated a natural criterion of theoretical equivalence and argued that, by this criterion, the answer is "no".
1 I will argue here that the situation is more subtle than Glymour suggests, by characterizing a robust sense in which two theories may be equivalent that Glymour's criterion does not capture. This alternative sense of equivalence, which is in the same spirit as Glymour's, is best construed as a friendly amendment. Still, it will turn out that by this alternative criterion, Newtonian gravitation is equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation-at least on one way of construing Newtonian gravitation. 2 It follows that there exist realistic theories that are equivalent in a robust and precise sense, but which apparently disagree regarding certain basic features of the world, such as whether spacetime is flat or curved.
The paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by briefly reviewing the two versions of Newtonian gravitation. I will then describe Glymour's criterion for theoretical equivalence, according to which the two versions of Newtonian gravitation fail to be equivalent. Next, I
will apply Glymour's criterion to two formulations of electromagnetism that, I will argue, should be (and typically are) taken to be equivalent. It will turn out that these theories fail to be equivalent by Glymour's criterion of equivalence. In the following sections, I will develop an alternative notion of equivalence between theories that I will argue does capture the sense in which these two formulations of electromagnetism are equivalent. I will then return to the question of principal interest in the present paper, arguing that there are two ways of construing standard (nongeometrized) Newtonian gravitation. I will state and prove a simple proposition to the effect that, by the alternative criterion, on one of the two ways of construing standard Newtonian gravitation (but not the other), it is theoretically equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation. I will conclude by drawing some morals concerning the interpretation of physical theories. Proofs of selected propositions appear in an appendix.
Two formulations of Newtonian gravitation
The two theories with which I am principally concerned are Newtonian gravitation (NG) and a variant of Newtonian gravitation due toÉlie Cartan (1923 Cartan ( , 1924 and Kurt Friedrichs (1927) , called "Newton-Cartan theory" or "geometrized Newtonian gravitation" (GNG).
3 In NG, gravitation is a force exerted by massive bodies on other massive bodies. It is mediated 2 David Zaret (1980) has also replied to Glymour on this question. But his argument is markedly different than the one presented here, and Spirtes and Glymour (1982) offer what I take to be an effective reply.
3 For background on geometrized Newtonian gravitation, see Malament (2012) or Trautman (1965) .
2 by a gravitational potential, and in the presence of a (non-constant) gravitational potential, massive bodies will accelerate. In GNG, meanwhile, gravitation is "geometrized" in much the same way as in general relativity: the geometrical properties of spacetime depend on the distribution of matter, and conversely, gravitational effects are manifestations of this geometry. Despite these differences, however, there is a precise sense, which I will state below, in which the theories are empirically equivalent. The central question of the paper is whether they are also equivalent in some stronger sense.
On both theories, spacetime is represented by a four dimensional manifold, which I will assume throughout is contractible. This manifold is equipped with two (degenerate) metrics:
a temporal metric t ab that assigns temporal lengths to vectors, and a spatial metric h ab that (indirectly) assigns spatial lengths to vectors. 4 These are required to satisfy h ab t bc = 0
everywhere. There always exists (at least locally) a covector field t a such that t ab = t a t b ; in cases where the spacetime is "temporally orientable", this field can be defined globally. In what follows, I will limit attention to temporally orientable spacetimes. Finally, we assume spacetime is endowed with a derivative operator ∇ that is compatible with both metrics, in the sense that ∇ a t bc = 0 and ∇ a h bc = 0 everywhere. These four elements together define a classical spacetime, written (M, t a , h ab , ∇). Matter in both theories is represented by its mass density field, which is a smooth scalar field ρ. Massive point particles are represented by their worldlines-smooth curves whose tangent vector fields ξ a satisfy ξ a t a = 0. Such curves are called timelike.
In this context, NG is the theory whose models are classical spacetimes with flat (R a bcd = 0) derivative operators, endowed with a gravitational potential, which is a scalar field ϕ satisfying Poisson's equation, ∇ a ∇ a ϕ = 4πρ. 5 A massive point particle whose worldline has tangent field ξ a will accelerate according to ξ n ∇ n ξ a = −∇ a ϕ. In the geometrized version of the theory, meanwhile, the derivative operator is permitted to be curved and the gravitational potential is omitted. The curvature field associated with the derivative operator satisfies a geometrized version of Poisson's equation, R ab = 4πρt a t b , and in the absence of any external (i.e., non-gravitational) interactions, massive particles traverse timelike geodesics of this curved derivative operator. In both cases, we take the "empirical content" of the theory to consist in the allowed trajectories of massive bodies, given a particular mass density.
Given a model of NG, it is always possible to produce a (unique) model of GNG that agrees on empirical content in this sense.
Proposition 2.1 (Trautman (1965) 
g ∇ is the unique derivative operator on M such that given any timelike curve with tangent vector
and the Riemann curvature tensor relative to
It is also possible to go in the other direction, as follows.
Proposition 2.2 (Trautman (1965) It is important emphasize that the pair ( already been assumed to hold of models of GNG; for present purposes, I will limit attention to models of GNG that also satisfy conditions (2) and (3). 
Glymour on theoretical equivalence
I will now turn to Glymour's account of theoretical equivalence. The underlying intuition is that two theories are theoretically equivalent if (1) the are empirically equivalent and (2) they are mutually inter-translatable. 7 In general, empirical equivalence is a slippery concept, but we will not discuss it further. For present purposes, it suffices to stipulate that the theories being compared are empirically equivalent, in the precise senses described.
Glymour makes the second condition, of mutual inter-translatability, precise via the notion of definitional equivalence in first order logic. equivalence captures a sense of inter-translatability in that, given any pair of definitionally equivalent theories T 1 and T 2 and a formula ̺ in the language of T 1 , it is always possible to translate ̺ into a formula in the language of T 2 , and then back into a formula in the language of T 1 that is T 1 −provably equivalent to ̺.
Definitional equivalence is a natural notion of equivalence for first order theories. But it is difficult to apply to physical theories, since we rarely have first order formulations available. 7 Glymour does not state that empirical equivalence is a necessary condition for theoretical equivalence, though he does appear to take theoretical equivalence to be strictly stronger than empirical equivalence, and, as Sklar (1982) emphasizes, empirical equivalence is a substantive interpretive constraint that goes beyond any formal relations between two theories.
8 For details on explicit definability and definitional equivalence, see Hodges (1993, Ch. 2.6) . See also the classic work by de Bouvere (1965b,a) . . We may thus turn A into a model A 2 of T 2 by restricting A to symbols in the language of T 2 . The whole process can then be reversed to recover A 1 . In this sense, definitionally equivalent theories "have the same models" insofar as a model of one theory can be systematically transformed into a model of the other theory, and vice versa.
9
Using this model-theoretic characterization of definitional equivalence as inspiration, Glymour proposes the following criterion of equivalence for physical theories expressed in terms of covariant objects on a manifold.
10
Criterion 1. Theories T 1 and T 2 are theoretically equivalent if for every model M 1 in T 1 , there exists a unique model M 2 in T 2 that (1) has the same empirical content as M 1 and (2) is such that the geometrical objects associated with M 2 are uniquely and covariantly definable in terms of the elements of M 1 and the geometrical objects associated with M 1 are uniquely and covariantly definable in terms of M 2 , and vice versa.
GNG and NG fail to meet this criterion. The reason is that, although it is always possible given a model M 1 of NG to uniquely and covariantly define a model M 2 of GNG, it is not possible to go in the other direction: given M 2 , there are many corresponding models of NG.
A problem case for Glymour?
I will presently argue that criterion 1 does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I will do so by displaying two "theories" (actually, formulations of a single theory) that usually are (I claim correctly) taken to be equivalent, but which fail to meet Glymour's criterion. These theories correspond to two ways of presenting classical electromagnetism on Minkowski spacetime, (M, η ab ).
11
On the first formulation of the theory, which I will call EM 1 , the dynamical variable a smooth, antisymmetric tensor field F ab on M. This field is called the Faraday tensor; it represents the electromagnetic field on spacetime. The Faraday tensor satisfies Maxwell's equations, which may be written as (1
smooth vector field representing charge-current density. (Here ∇ is the Levi-Civita derivative operator compatible with η ab .) Models on this formulation may be written (M, η ab , F ab ). On the second formulation, which I will call EM 2 , the dynamical variable is a smooth vector field A a on M, called the 4−vector potential. This field satisfies the differential equation
These two formulations are systemically related. Given a vector potential A a on M, one may define a Faraday tensor by
. This tensor will satisfy Maxwell's equations for some J a if A a satisfies the differential equation above for the same J a . Conversely, given a Faraday tensor F ab satisfying Maxwell's equations (for some J a ), there always exists a vector potential A a satisfying the required differential equation (for that J a ), such that
. We stipulate that on both formulations, the empirical content of a model is exhausted by its associated Faraday tensor. In this sense, the theories are empirically equivalent, since for any model of EM 1 , there is a corresponding model of EM 2 with the same empirical content (for some fixed J a ), and vice versa. 
Thus we do have unique recovery of models of EM ′ 2 from models of EM 1 . We still face the second problem, however, since it is still not clear that there is an expression by which we may covariantly define an equivalence class [A a ] in terms of an antisymmetric tensor F ab . To address this problem, we return to first order logic. In that context, a classic result known as Svenonius' theorem that states (roughly) that a relation is (explicitly) definable in a first order theory just in case the relation is invariant under the automorphisms of the models of that theory (see Hodges, 1993, §5.10) . This result provides an alternative model-theoretic characterization of definitional equivalence. Of course, as in our discussion of Glymour's criterion, we cannot apply the new characterization directly.
But it does suggest an alternative way of adapting definitional equivalence to the present context, by using the invariance properties of the models of our theories. Indeed, there is a sense in which Glymour's characterization in terms of covariant definability already incorporates an invariance requirement of precisely this sort, since covariance amounts to a 9 condition on how objects behave under diffeomorphisms.
These considerations suggest the following idea. Instead of requiring explicit covariant definability, we require that the geometrical objects characterizing models of two theories be invariant under the same diffeomorphisms. 
13
This result provides a sense in which the models of EM ′ 2 might be said to be implicitly definable from the models of EM 1 . Putting Props. 5.1 and 5.2 together, meanwhile, (almost) captures the sense in which EM 1 and EM ′ 2 are equivalent.
It would be desirable to abstract away from this specific case and articulate a more general criterion. To do so, observe that the relationship between EM 1 and EM ′ 2 that is captured by Props. 5.1 and 5.2 concerns not only the models, but also maps between the modelsnamely, the diffeomorphisms that preserve the structure of the models. This suggests that we might be able to extract a general criterion of equivalence by representing these theories not as collections of models, but as categories of models.
14 That is, we define a category EM 1 whose objects are models of EM 1 and whose arrows are isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve the Faraday tensor, and a category EM Given these categories, we may then prove the following result.
Corollary 5.3. There exists an isomorphism of categories between EM 1 and EM 2 that preserves empirical content.
Prop. 5.3 captures the sense of equivalence given by the conjunction of Props. 5.1 and 5.2, but it is slightly stronger: it says not only that the corresponding models of EM 1 and EM 2
13 Here χ * is the pushforward along χ, defined for differential forms because χ is a diffeomorphism. 14 For more on this proposal, see Halvorson (2012) and Halvorson and Weatherall (2015) ; for more on categories and functors, see Mac Lane (1998), Awodey (2006 ), or Borceux (2008 , among many other excellent texts.
are invariant under the same diffeomorphisms, but also that those invariances are compatible with what might be thought of as the algebraic structure of the diffeomorphisms.
Prop. 5.3 suggests the following new criterion of equivalence.
Criterion 1
′ . Two theories are theoretically equivalent just in case there exists an isomorphism between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
I call this criterion 1
′ because it bears a very close relationship to Glymour's original criterion.
In effect, all we have done is move from one version of the definability clause of criterion 1 to another-equivalent in first order logic-to generate a criterion that is a bit more convenient to use in the present context. This is not to say the resulting criteria are the same-as we have seen, criterion 1 ′ is strictly weaker than 1, since EM 1 and EM we began with? After all, it was this theory that we originally wanted to claim was equivalent to EM 1 . We may define a category of models of this theory, too: as a first pass, we take EM 2 to be the category whose objects are models of EM 2 and whose arrows are isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve the vector potential. But this category is not isomorphic to EM 1 -and so, on this representation of EM 2 , EM 1 and EM 2 are still not equivalent, even by criterion 1 ′ . The problem is the same as with Glymour's criterion: roughly speaking, there is a failure of uniqueness.
We have already argued that this sort of non-uniqueness is spurious, at least on the standard interpretation of EM 2 , because models related by a gauge transformation should be counted as physically equivalent. The category EM 2 does not reflect this equivalence between models, because in general, two models that differ by a gauge transformation will not be isomorphic in this category. On the other hand, we also know that there is another class of mapping between models that does reflect this sort of physical equivalence-namely, the gauge transformations themselves. These maps do not appear as arrows in the category EM 2 , which suggests that if we want to represent EM 2 accurately, in the sense of representing it in a way that accords with what structure we take to be physically significant on the standard interpretation, we need a different category, one that includes information about the gauge transformations.
We define such a category as follows: we take EM 2 to be the category whose objects are models of EM 2 and whose arrows are pairs of the form (χ, G a ), where G a is closed and χ is an isometry that preserves the (gauge transformed) vector potential A a + G a .
Proposition 5.4. EM 2 is a category.
Note that EM 2 is naturally understood to include the arrows of EM 1 , which may be identified with pairs of the form (χ, 0), the gauge transformations, which are arrows of the form
(1 M , G a ), and compositions of these.
Intuitively speaking, EM 2 is the result of taking EM 2 and "adding" arrows corresponding to the gauge transformations. Simply adding arrows in this way, however, does not yield a category that is (empirical-content-preservingly) isomorphic to EM 1 . The reason is that the extra arrows do not address the failure of unique recovery. But that does not mean this exercise was in vain. Although there is not an isomorphism between EM 1 and EM 2 that preserves empirical content, there is an equivalence of categories that does so.
Proposition 5.5. There is an equivalence of categories between EM 1 and EM 2 that preserves empirical content.
Equivalent categories may be thought of as categories that are isomorphic "up to object isomorphism"-which is precisely the notion of equivalence we argued we were looking for between EM 1 and EM 2 at the end of the last section.
The considerations in the last paragraph suggest a new, still weaker criterion.
Criterion 2. Two theories are theoretically equivalence just in case there exists an equivalence between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
Prop. 5.5 establishes that EM 1 and EM 2 are theoretically equivalent by this new criterionso long as we represent EM 2 by EM 2 , rather than EM 2 . It is in this sense, I claim, that the two formulations of electromagnetism should be taken to be equivalent.
As a final remark, let me observe that criterion 2 also captures the sense in which EM 2 and EM ′ 2 are equivalent. In particular, these theories are not equivalent by criterion 1 ′ , even though EM ′ 2 and EM 2 may seem to be equally good ways of capturing "gauge equivalence"
in a formal representation of EM 2 . This fact reflects the more general fact that for most mathematical purposes, equivalence of categories is a more natural and fruitful notion of "sameness" of categories than isomorphism. It also suggests that criterion 1 ′ is at best an awkward half-way point once we have begun thinking in the present terms.
Are NG and GNG theoretically equivalent?
With these new criteria in hand, we now return to the question at the heart of the paper.
To apply either criterion to NG and GNG, however, one first needs to say what categories we will use to represent the theories. For GNG, there is a clear choice. We represent GNG by the category GNG whose objects are classical spacetimes (M, t a , h ab , ∇) satisfying the required curvature conditions from Prop. 2.1, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that preserve the classical metrics and the derivative operator.
15
NG is more complicated, however. There is a natural option for the objects: they are classical spacetimes with gravitational potentials (M, t a , h ab , ∇, ϕ), where ∇ flat. But we face a choice concerning the arrows, corresponding to a choice about which models of NG are physically equivalent.
Option 1. One takes models of NG that differ with regard to the gravitational potential to be distinct.
15 Given a diffeomorphism χ : M → M ′ and derivative operators ∇ and ∇ ′ on M and M ′ respectively, we say that χ preserves ∇ if for any tensor field λ 
for any smooth ψ satisfying ∇ a ∇ b ψ = 0, to be equivalent.
16
In the second case, one takes the gravitational potential to be a gauge quantity, much like the vector potential in electromagnetism. In the first case, one does not.
These two options suggest different categories. In particular, we define NG 1 to be the category whose objects are as above, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that preserve the classical metrics, the derivative operator, and the gravitational potential, and we define NG 2 to be the category with the same objects, but whose arrows are pairs (χ, ψ), where ψ is a smooth scalar field satisfying ∇ a ∇ b ψ = 0, and χ is a diffeomorphism that preserves the classical metrics and the (gauge transformed) derivative operator
and gravitational potential ϕ + ψ. The first category corresponds to option 1, while the second corresponds to option 2. Since these options correspond to different interpretations of the formalism, I will treat them as prima facie distinct theories, labeled as NG 1 and NG 2 ,
respectively, in what follows.
What considerations might lead one to prefer one option over the other? The first option better reflects how physicists have traditionally thought of Newtonian gravitation. On the other hand, this option appears to distinguish between models that are not empirically distinguishable, even in principle. Moreover, there are systems in which option 1 leads to problems, such as cosmological models with homogeneous and isotropic matter distributions, where option 1 generates contradictions that option 2 avoids. 17 These latter arguments strike me as compelling, and I tend to agree with the conclusion that option 2 is preferable. But I will not argue further for this thesis, and for the purposes of the present paper, I will remain agnostic about which way of understanding NG is preferable.
16 Note that, since all of the derivative operators considered in NG and GNG agree once one raises their index, one can characterize the gauge transformation with regard to any of them without ambiguity.
17 For more on this, see the debate between John Norton (1992, 1995) and David Malament (1995 We may now ask: are any of these theories pairwise equivalent by either criterion? None of these theories are equivalent by criterion 1 ′ , effectively for the reason that NG and GNG fail to be equivalent by Glymour's original criterion.
18 Moreover, NG 1 is not equivalent to either GNG or NG 2 by criterion 2. But GNG and NG 2 are equivalent by criterion 2.
Proposition 6.1. There is an equivalence of categories between NG 2 and GNG that preserves empirical content.
The situation is summarized by table 1.
Interpreting physical theories: some morals
I have now made the principal arguments of the paper. In short, criterion 1 does not capture the sense in which EM 1 and EM 2 are equivalent. However, there is a natural alternative criterion that does capture the sense in which EM 1 and EM 2 are equivalent. And by this criterion, GNG and NG are equivalent too, if one adopts option 2 above. Moreover, criterion 2 highlights an important distinction between two ways of understanding NG.
There are a few places where one might object. One might say that no formal criterion captures what it would mean for two theories to be equivalent. 19 One might also reject the significance of the particular criteria discussed here. I do not agree with these objections, but I will not consider them further. For the remainder of this paper, I will suppose that 18 Note, however, that one could construct an alternative presentation of NG 2 analogous to EM ′ 2 , in such a way that this would be equivalent to GNG by criterion 1 ′ . Moreover, if one restricts attention to the collections of models of NG and GNG in which (1) the matter distribution is supported on a spatially compact region and (2) the gravitational field (for models of NG) vanishes at spatial infinity, then NG 1 , NG 2 , and GNG are all equivalent by both criteria.
19 For versions of this worry, see Sklar (1982) and Coffey (2014) .
criterion 2 does capture an interesting and robust sense in which these theories may be equivalent. If this is right, there are several observations to make.
First of all, the arguments here support one of Glymour's principal claims, which is that there exist empirically equivalent, theoretically inequivalent theories. This is because even if NG 2 and GNG are theoretically equivalent, NG 1 and GNG are still inequivalent, even by condition 2. Glymour's further claim that GNG is better supported by the empirical evidence, on his account of confirmation, is only slightly affected, in that one needs to specify that GNG is only better supported than NG 1 . This makes sense: the reason, on
Glymour's account, that GNG is better supported than NG is supposed to be that NG makes additional, unsupported ontological claims regarding the existence of a gravitational potential. But one can understand the difference between NG 1 and NG 2 in this way as well, since NG 2 explicitly equivocates between models that differ with regard to their gravitational potentials.
There is another purpose to which Glymour puts these arguments, however. There is a view, originally due to Poincaré (1905) and Reichenbach (1958) , that the geometrical properties of spacetime are a matter of convention because there always exist empirically equivalent theories that differ with regard to (for instance) whether spacetime is curved or flat. 20 Glymour argues against conventionalism by pointing out that the empirical equivalence of two theories does not imply that they are equally well confirmed, since the theories may be theoretically inequivalent. But the present discussion suggests that there is another possibility that is not often considered: theories that attribute apparently distinct geometrical properties to the world may be more than just empirically equivalent.
As I have just noted, one way of understanding NG 2 is as a theory on which the gravitational potential is not a real feature of the world, because the gravitational potential is not preserved by mappings that reflect physical equivalence. GNG, meanwhile, does not make any reference to a gravitational potential. In this sense GNG and NG 2 appear to have the same ontological implications, at least with regard to gravitational potentials. Still, GNG
and NG 2 do differ in one important way. In particular, in all models of NG 2 , spacetime is flat. In generic models of GNG, conversely, spacetime may be curved. Thus, at least in this context, there is a sense in which classical spacetime admits equally good, theoretically equivalent descriptions as either curved or flat.
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Let me emphasize that this view is not a recapitulation of traditional conventionalism about geometry. For one, it is not a general claim about spacetime geometry; the view here depends on the details of the geometry of classical spacetime physics. Indeed, there is good (though perhaps not dispositive) reason to think that general relativity, for instance,
is not equivalent to a theory on which spacetime is flat, by any of the criteria discussed here. 22 More generally, I do not believe that it is a matter of convention whether we choose one empirically equivalent theory over another. There are often very good reasons to think one theory is better supported than or otherwise preferable to an empirically equivalent alternative. Rather, the point is that in some cases, apparently different descriptions of the world-such as a description on which spacetime is flat and one on which it is curvedamount to the same thing, insofar as they have exactly the same capacities to represent physical situations. In a sense, they say the same things about the world.
The suggestion developed in the last few paragraphs will worry some readers. Indeed, one might be inclined to reject criterion 2 on the grounds that one has antecedent or even a priori reason for thinking that there is, in all cases, an important distinction-perhaps 21 There is a caveat worth mentioning: although spacetime is flat in all models of NG 2 , and thus in all models, parallel transport of vectors is path independent, the result of parallel transporting any particular vector along a given (fixed) curve will generally vary even between equivalent models, because the derivative operator varies with gauge transformations. Thus one might think that GNG provides a more perspicuous representation of spacetime geometry, since the geometrical facts are obscured by the gauge transformations on NG 2 . (I am grateful to Oliver Pooley for pressing this point; Knox (2014) makes a closely related point.)
22 See Knox (2011) and Manchak (2014) for evidence supporting this claim.
a metaphysical distinction-between a theory that says spacetime is flat and one that says spacetime is curved. Two theories that disagree in this regard could not both be true, because at most one could accurately reflect the facts about the curvature of spacetime, and thus, two such theories could not be equivalent. I think this position is probably tenable.
But it seems to me to get things backwards. At the very least, let me simply say that there is another way of looking at matters, whereby one allows that the distinctions that one can sensibly draw may depend on the structure of the world. And the our best guide to understanding what those distinctions are will be to study the properties of and relationships between our best physical theories.
Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Prop. 5.1.
Suppose there were vector potentials
, and thus
Proof of Prop. 5.2.
Suppose we have an isometry χ as described. Then for every
But exterior derivatives commute with pushforwards along diffeomorphisms, and so
Proof of Prop. 5.4. EM 2 includes identity arrows, which are pairs of the form (1 M , 0); (2) it contains all compositions of arrows, since given any two arrows (χ, G a ) and (χ ′ , G ′ a ) with appropriate domain and codomain, (χ
is also an arrow; and (3) composition of arrows is associative, since given three pairs (χ, G a ), (χ ′ , G ′ a ), and (χ ′′ , G ′′ a ) with appropriate domain and codomain, (χ
Proof of Prop. 5.5.
It suffices to show that there is a functor from EM 2 to EM 1 that is full, faithful, and essentially surjective, and which preserves F ab . Consider the functor E : EM 2 → EM 1 defined as follows: E acts on objects as (M,
) and on arrows as 
suppose for contradiction that χ = χ ′ . Since by hypothesis these are distinct arrows, it must
. So we have a contradiction, and χ = χ ′ . Thus the induced map on arrows is injective. Now consider (for contradiction) that χ = χ ′ . Then ψ = ψ ′ , since the arrows were assumed to be distinct.
But then ϕ + ψ = ϕ + ψ ′ , and so (ϕ + ψ) • χ = (ϕ + ψ ′ ) • χ. Thus χ = χ ′ and E is faithful. Now consider any arrow χ : E(A) → E(A ′ ); we need to show that there is an arrow from A to A ′ that E maps to χ. I claim that the pair (χ, ϕ ′ • χ − ϕ) : A → A ′ is such an arrow.
Clearly if this arrow exists in NG 2 , E maps it to χ, so it only remains to show that this arrow exists. First, observe that since χ is an arrow from E(A) to E(A ′ ), χ : M → M ′ is a diffeomorphism such that χ * (t a ) = t We will do this for an arbitrary vector field; the argument for general tensor fields proceeds identically. Consider some vector field ξ a . Then χ * (∇ n ξ a ) = χ * (∇ n ξ a − t n t m ξ m ∇ a (ϕ 
is the derivative operator associated with E(A ′ ). So χ does preserve the gauge transformed derivative operator. The final step is to confirm that ∇ a ∇ b (ϕ ′ •χ−ϕ) = 0.
To do this, again consider an arbitrary vector field ξ a on M. We have just shown that
. Now consider acting on both sides of this equation with ∇ ′a . Beginning with the left hand side (and recalling that ∇ and ∇ ′ are both flat), we find:
The right hand side, meanwhile, yields −∇ ′n (χ * (t a t m ξ m ∇ b (ϕ
). Comparing these, we conclude that χ * (t a t m ξ m ∇ n ∇ b (ϕ − ϕ ′ • χ)) = 0, and thus t a t m ξ m ∇ n ∇ b (ϕ − ϕ ′ • χ) = 0. But since t a is non-zero and this must hold for any vector field ξ a , it follows that
Thus E is full.
